We examine the phenomenon of real-income stagnation in a large cross-section of countries during the last four decades. Stagnation is defi ned as negligible or negative growth extending over a number of years. We fi nd that stagnation has aff ected more than three fi fths of countries (103 out of 168). Stagnating countries were more likely to have been poor, in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa, confl ict ridden and dependent on primary commodity exports. Stagnation is recurrent: countries that were stagnators in the 1960s had a likelihood of 75 percent of having been stagnators in the 1990s. JEL Classifi cation: O10, O11, O47
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Sanjay G. Reddy and Camelia Minoiu Th e literature on the determinants of average real income growth is vast. However, until recently little attention has been paid to characterizing or explaining the qualitative features of the income or growth sequence (going beyond averages). Th ere is a burgeoning interest in understanding patterns (as opposed to average levels) of economic growth. Examples include Ben-David and Papell (1998) (who attempt to identify structural breaks in the income series between 1950 and 1990 in a cross section of countries) and Pritchett (2000) (which analyzes the instability and volatility of growth rates). Rodrik (1999) considers "growth collapses" and concludes that countries that are confl ict-ridden and have weak institutions of confl ict-management have experienced the sharpest income downturns. More recently, patterns of "growth acceleration" have been studied by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) , who fi nd that growth acceleration episodes are not well predicted by standard growth determinants or by the occurrence of economic reforms.
Th is paper contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. Firstly, it describes patterns of growth in an innovative way. Specifi cally, the paper identifi es and describes episodes of sustained negligible or negative income growth, which we refer to as stagnation spells. We discuss the conceptual diff erence between real income stagnation spells and other concepts concerning the pattern of economic growth. Secondly, the paper aims to identify the factors disposing countries to stagnation.
We fi nd that real income stagnation has aff ected a signifi cant number of countries (103 out of 168). Countries that suff ered spells of real income stagnation are found more likely to be poor, in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa, confl ict ridden and dependent on primary commodity exports. Stagnation is also found very likely to persist over time.
Th e study of growth patterns is driven by two main motivations, one explanatory and the other normative, both of which underpin our work. Th e explanatory motive is to analyze patterns of real income growth in order better to understand the process of economic growth. Th e normative motive is to determine whether and how distinct welfare assessments should be made of diff erent income streams (and associated growth patterns).
Th e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Th e next section defi nes stagnation, describes the conceptual diff erence between stagnation and low average growth, that between stagnation spells and other features of the growth sequence, and discusses the welfare implications of diff erent stagnation experiences. In the following section, we describe features of the stagnation experience in a large cross-section of countries between 1960 and 2001. Th e fourth section investigates the factors associated with stagnation. Th e penultimate section provides evidence of the persistence of stagnation over time. Th e fi nal section contains our conclusions.
What Is Stagnation?
Identifying and explaining stagnation may in principle require a distinct approach than does identifying and explaining the causes of poor growth experience as such. Th e reason is that stagnation spells are concentrated periods of negligible or negative growth. An uninterrupted sequence of poor growth years constitutes a stagnation spell. In this section of the paper, we begin by formalizing the concept of stagnation. Th ereafter, we discuss the conceptual diff erence between stagnation and low average growth. Finally, we discuss whether the occurrence of stagnation spells should infl uence our judgments concerning the welfare experienced by diff erent countries.
Identifying Spells of Stagnation
We use time-series data on the GDP per capita of countries. 2 Th e study period is . Since data are not available for all countries and all years, the 'end of the study period' for a specifi c country refers to the most recent year for which data are available.
Th e onset of a stagnation spell is defi ned as a year in which a country's per capita real income is lower than at any time in the previous two years and higher than at any time in the subsequent four years. At the onset of a stagnation spell, a country's per capita real income is both the lowest in the three-year interval concluding with it, and the highest in the fi ve-year interval beginning with it. Th is criterion is deliberately defi ned stringently, so as to avoid identifying brief interruptions of growth as stagnation spells. Although the onset of a stagnation spell is defi ned in terms of the relation between income levels in adjacent years, the motive is reliably to identify the onset of periods of sustained negligible or negative income growth.
A turning point is defi ned as a year in which a country's real income is at least one per cent higher than it was in the previous year, and at least one per cent lower than it is in the subsequent year. Th is criterion is made permissive, so as to capture the resumption of sustained income growth, even at a low level.
2 Income in a given year is represented by the three-year moving average centered on that year, in order to focus on meaningful variations that are not due to measurement error or very fl eeting economic shocks. We use data on the GDP per capita in constant local currency units. Our reason for using LCUs is that PPP-adjusted real GDP fi gures are not, properly speaking, inter-temporally comparable. Attempts to make them so, such as the Penn World Table (Version 6.1), introduce other distortions that we wish to avoid here. Th e spells of stagnation that we identify are largely dependent on the features of the per-capita income time series, which are appropriately captured by LCU data. Inter-country comparability of time-series is not required for this purpose. Th e main aim of the paper is to introduce the concept of real income stagnation and examine its empirical relevance. We operationalize the concept of real income stagnation using LCU GDP data; however the analysis can easily be conducted using PPP-adjusted GDP fi gures instead. Such an exercise would yield largely similar results due to the high correlation between year-on-year growth rates of the two GDP series. We have calculated these correlations for a sub-sample of 108 countries from our main dataset (for which PPP-adjusted GDP data for 1960-2000 are available in PTW Version 6.1). Almost two thirds of the countries had a simple correlation coeffi cient larger than 0.80, and three quarters of the sampled countries had a correlation coeffi cient larger than 0.70. For specifi c countries, the two times series diverge [For a detailed study of the divergence between PWT and LCU data in the case of Venezuela, see Rodriguez (2006) ]. In our view the LCU time series is to be strongly preferred in such cases since it is dependent on local national income data and does not refl ect adjustments brought about for the sole purpose of level comparability across countries. Th e PWT income series for a country often refl ects the use of arbitrary premises or adjustments for a variety of reasons including the past or present non-participation of many countries in the price surveys of the International Comparison Programme (requiring reliance upon questionable regression estimates for these countries), the arbitrary choice of overlapping 'link countries' to relate real incomes in one region to real incomes elsewhere, the impact of the choice of base year on comparisons of real-incomes across country-years, and other factors. We do use PWT incomes where they are needed to undertake cross-sectional comparisons of countries.
A spell of stagnation is defi ned as the period from the onset of stagnation to the fi rst turning point after the onset. We defi ne the length of a spell as the length of this period. Since the criterion for identifying the onset of stagnation is stringent and the criterion for identifying the turning point is permissive, spells defi ned in this way are defi ned stringently.
Th e depth of a spell of stagnation is defi ned as the diff erence between the income at the onset and the minimum income during the spell, expressed as a share of the income at the end of the study period. Th e depth of the spell of stagnation has a counterfactual interpretation. Specifi cally, it represents the percentage by which the per capita income of a country would be higher than it is at the end of the study period if it had experienced a constant income between the onset of stagnation and the year in which the minimum income during the spell was attained instead of having had the income path that it actually had. Th is counterfactual is conservative in that it assumes zero growth rather than positive growth in this time interval. Th e concepts of spell of stagnation, depth and length of stagnation, are illustrated in Figure 1 for Syria.
Th e income at the end of the study period is defi ned as the average of the incomes in the last three years of the study period , so as to avoid idiosyncratic results that derive from the presence of short-term volatility.
Identifying Countries as Stagnators
A stagnator is defi ned as a country that has experienced a spell of stagnation at some point during the study period.
A country's length of stagnation is defi ned as the sum of the lengths of all of the spells of stagnation it has experienced.
A country's depth of stagnation is defi ned as the sum of the depths of all of the spells of stagnation it has experienced. A country's depth of stagnation has a counterfactual interpretation. Specifi cally, it represents the percentage by which the per capita income of a country would be higher than it is at the end of the study period if it had experienced a constant income between the onset of every spell of stagnation and the year in which the minimum income during that spell was attained, instead of having had the income path that it actually had. Th is counterfactual is conservative in that it assumes zero growth rather than positive growth over each such time interval.
During a given decade, a country is defi ned as a decadal stagnator if at least three years within the decade belong to a stagnation spell. Th is defi nition is designed to avoid counting as decadal stagnators countries that merely experienced the end (or beginning) of a spell of stagnation in a given decade. Rather, it identifi es a country as a decadal stagnator if it has experienced a suffi ciently long period of stagnation in the decade.
A country's decadal length of stagnation is defi ned as the number of years spent in spells of stagnation during the decade.
A spell of stagnation is used to calculate the decadal depth of stagnation (defi ned below) if at least three years belonging to the spell are contained within the decade.
A country's decadal depth of stagnation is defi ned as the percentage by which its income at the end of the decade 3 would have been higher if it had experienced zero growth in each interval from the fi rst year of a stagnation spell within the decade to the point at which its minimum income during the spell and during the decade were experienced (rather than having had the growth experience that it actually did).
Stagnation versus Low Average Growth
Th e conceptual diff erence between stagnation (as defi ned above) and low average income growth can be understood as follows: a stagnation spell consists of an uninterrupted sequence of poor growth years. In contrast, an episode of low income growth can be composed of any sequence of growth years, including a sequence which involves alternating positive and negative income shocks. Diff erent income paths can possess the same average growth rates but very diff erent patterns of growth, some of which contain stagnation spells and some of which do not. Suppose that t y represents the real income per capita of a country in time period t, and t y represents the growth rate of real income per capita between (t-1) and t. Consider the following identity, which refl ects the fi nal income achieved by a country, given its initial income and annual growth rates:
Th e fi nal income T y is invariant to the sequence in which the growth rates t y appear. Further, the average (geometric mean) growth rate over the period is invariant to the sequence. Countries can possess identical per capita income growth rates but very diff erent growth sequences. As discussed briefl y below (and also noted, for example, in Reddy and Minoiu (2005) ), the resulting distinct growth sequences can have very diff erent welfare implications.
Our focus in this paper is however on the description and interpretation of a possible feature of a growth sequence. In particular, we examine the occurrence in countries of uninterrupted sequences of negligible or negative income growth years (i.e., stagnation spells) as distinguished from patterns of negative income growth years alternating in some way with positive income growth years.
Distinguishing Stagnation from other Features of the Growth Sequence
Consider a sequence of real incomes{ } t y . Associated with this sequence of real incomes is a sequence of rates of growth t t y y
Associated with the sequence of rates of growth is in turn a sequence of rates of
Inter-temporal economic patterns can be sought in relation to any one of these three series. For example, it may be of interest to examine the lowness or (highness) of incomes, of growth rates, or of rates of acceleration. Th e concept of stagnation employed in this paper adopts a focus on uninterrupted sequences of low growth rates. In contrast, other recent contributions to the literature (e.g., Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005 ) (henceforth, 'HPR') adopt a "hybrid" concept, which simultaneously refers to more than one of these levels of analysis. An episode of growth acceleration is defi ned by HPR as fulfi lling the following conditions: the average growth rate between the beginning of the acceleration episode and its end is at least 3.5 per cent per annum; the diff erence between the mean growth rate during the acceleration episode and the period preceding it is at least 2 per cent per annum. Finally, the post-episode income level is higher than the pre-episode peak. It is evident that HPR's approach mizes criteria involving income levels, rates of growth and rates of growth acceleration. From this standpoint, it is far from clear that it captures growth accelerations as such. Th e criteria used also appear to be somewhat ad hoc.
Growth Patterns and Welfare
It should be noted that neither the concept of real income stagnation, nor that of growth accelerations, can be used straightforwardly for purposes of welfare assessment. In this section, we shall use a few examples to illustrate the issues involved in making welfare comparisons of income streams characterized by stagnation experiences and associated steady-growth counterfactuals.
If two countries' income streams begin and end at the same income levels over a single time period, then the countries will possess the same (geometric) average growth rates. However, they may possess very diff erent income paths over this period. Consider, for example, the income growth experience of Jordan and Morocco between 1975 and 1991 [depicted in Figure 2 ]. In this period, the two countries had an average growth rate of 1.025 per cent. Th eir (Penn World Table Version 6.1) per capita income in 1975 was in both cases around $2,400 and that in 1991 was in both cases approximately $3,600. While Jordan experienced rapid early income growth followed by a stagnation spell between 1987 and 1992, Morocco's income path was characterized by fairly steady growth throughout the period. Despite the stagnation experience, Jordan experienced higher welfare throughout the period according to a simple criterion, that of fi rst-order dominance of its income stream over Morocco's: Jordan's income stream was at least as high in every year as Morocco's. On average during the period, Jordanians were richer than Moroccans by $1,093 international (1996 PPP) dollars.
Consider also the hypothetical case of two countries that possess the same average growth rate over a given period of time, and experience similar stagnation spells, but do so at diff erent times, and as a result experience very diff erent levels of material well-being. It is important to draw a distinction between an experience of stagnation which arises early in the study period and is followed by recovery, and an experience of stagnation that arises towards the end of the study period and is preceded by prolonged growth. An early stagnation spell followed by recovery will cause a country to have lost income relative to the steady-growth path, whereas an experience of high growth rates early on followed by a downturn towards the end of the period will lead a country to have gained wealth relative to the same steady-growth path. While both countries will be classifi ed as stagnators (and possess the same average growth rate), the timing of the stagnation spell is greatly relevant to assessing whether the country has experienced gains or losses in welfare relative to the steady-growth counterfactual. It is not the experience of stagnation alone, but the entirety of the growth path that is important in assessing welfare.
Average growth rates are a useful summary statistic for the income growth experience of a country, but can conceal the occurrence of large gains and losses in wealth or welfare. Since it is implausible to believe that the (net) wealth which accrues to a country over a period of time is inconsequential for investment, capital accumulation and human well-being, we may conclude that features of the entire growth path (including the occurrence and timing of stagnation experiences) will have welfare implications.
Stagnation Experience across Countries and over Time
In the next section we rely primarily on a data set that we have constructed by expanding that used to analyze the determinants of growth by Levine and Renelt (1992) . Our data set contains 119 countries for which constant LCU GDP per capita data are available over the period 1960-2001, thereby permitting the identifi cation of stagnation spells. Defi nitions and sources of all of the variables contained in the dataset are provided in Appendix 1. We treat the cases of small-island countries and transition countries (only some of which are included in the Levine and Renelt data set), separately. Table 1 reports the frequency with which stagnators appear among the countries that belong to the main data set. Of the 119 countries in the dataset, a remarkable 72 (or 60.5 per cent) are stagnators. Some striking facts are immediately apparent. For example, only 4 of the 24 rich countries belonging to the OECD were stagnators in this period (16.7 per cent). 4 In contrast 91.67 per cent (or 22 of 24) countries in Latin American and 82.5 per cent (or 33 of 40) countries in sub-Saharan Africa were stagnators.
Frequency and Features of Stagnation by Country Type

Countries in the Main Data Set
It is also interesting to note that stagnators are heavily represented among countries dependent on primary commodities. Among countries belonging to OPEC, 8 of 10 were stagnators. We also check how prevalent stagnators are among primary commodity export dependent countries, by constructing two alternative measures of such dependence. Countries are classifi ed as primary commodity exporters according to criterion I if the share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 was above the mean level for the sample. Countries are classifi ed as primary commodity exporters according to criterion II if the share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 was one standard deviation above the mean level for the sample. It is interesting to note that a very large proportion of primary commodity exporting countries are stagnators; the proportion of stagnators is roughly the same regardless of which criterion is used to identify primary commodity exporting countries (87.5 per cent when criterion I is used, and 83.3 per cent when criterion II is used). A majority of landlocked countries (65.2 per cent) are also stagnators. Table 2 reports in greater detail the stagnation experiences of the countries belonging to these diff erent categories. It may be observed that the average depth of stagnation among stagnators varies considerably across geographical categories, from 0.24 in the case of Latin America to 0.44 in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, whereas the average length of stagnation varies between 10 years (for Latin American countries) and 16 years (in the case of sub-Saharan African countries). Th us, sub-Saharan African countries tend to have both longer and deeper stagnation experiences than Latin American countries. Th e former also tend to have more stagnation spells per country than the latter (1.5 spells per country compared to 1.3 spells per country).
Remarkably, oil-exporting (OPEC) countries have both the highest average depth of stagnation among all categories of countries (0.97), as well as the highest number of stagnation spells (1.8 spells per country). Intensive (criterion II) primary commodity exporters have an average length of stagnation of 18 years (almost half the study period). Furthermore, the depth and length of stagnation increases with the intensity of primary commodity exports in GNP.
Appendix II identifi es the stagnation spells experienced by each of the countries in the sample as well as their traits. Th e longest spell of stagnation was experienced by Zambia (33 years, from 1968 to 2000) and the deepest was experienced by Iraq (2.89).
Transition Countries
Transition countries are not included in the main dataset, as for many countries the data with which to undertake the analysis do not exist for the period 1960 to 1990. Table 6 describes the frequency and features of stagnation among the transition countries, for which we have data during the period 1990-2001 5 . Of the 26 countries for which stagnation analysis was possible, 20 (or 77 per cent) were stagnators in this study period. Moreover, the average depth of stagnation was a striking 0.69 (more than two-thirds of the end of study period income) and the average length of stagnation was 6.6 (almost two-thirds of the study period). Th e country with the maximum depth of stagnation (2.37) was Tajikistan, whereas the country with the maximum length of stagnation (11 years) was Moldova.
Small Island Developing States
Many small island developing states are also not included in the main dataset, due to gaps in the data available for many of them. Table 7 describes the frequency and features of stagnation among small island developing states (as identifi ed by the United Nations) for the period 1960 to 2001. Of 34 countries for which stagnation analysis was possible, 17 were stagnators. Th e average depth of stagnation was 0.31 and the average length of stagnation was 11.5 years. Roughly half the island stagnators had a single spell of stagnation, and roughly half had two spells of stagnation. Th e maximum depth of stagnation (1.82) was experienced by Kiribati, while the maximum length of stagnation (26 years) was experienced by Haiti.
Th e World as a Whole
Th e unifi ed sample (including together the countries in the main dataset, transition countries and small island developing states) contains 178 countries. Of the 168 countries for which stagnation analysis was possible, 103 (61 per cent, i.e., more than half ) were stagnators.
Experience Across the Decades (the World)
Th e stagnation experience of countries across the decades is described in Table 3 (for countries in the main data set). It can be seen that the number of decadal stagnators increased sharply and steadily between the 1960s (when there were 12, amounting to 12 per cent of the countries for which data was available) and the 1980s (when there were 58, amounting to 50 per cent of the countries for which data was available), and diminished somewhat in the 1990s (to 36, amounting to 32 per cent of the countries for which data was available).
From a worldwide perspective, the 1980s seem to have been the worst decade. Th e average length of stagnation peaked in the 1980s at almost 7 years, as did the average depth of stagnation at 0.20. Th e average depth of stagnation increased monotonically from the 1960s to the 1980s before diminishing in the 1990s. Th e average length of stagnation varied between 5.5 and 6.8 years/country across the four decades, again peaking in the 1980s.
Experience Across the Decades (Regions)
Th e proportion of countries that are stagnators (among the countries for which the analysis is possible) is higher in every decade in sub-Saharan Africa than in Latin America, with the exception of the 1980s (Tables  5A and 5B ). For the whole study period however, the proportion of Latin American stagnators exceeds that of sub-Saharan African stagnators. In both continents, the proportion of stagnators among countries increases steadily through the decades, peaking in the 1980s (when it reached a maximum of 69 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 79 per cent in Latin America) and diminishing somewhat in the 1990s. Table 4 , in all four decades the countries that spent the longest number of years in stagnation were most likely to be in sub-Saharan Africa. As shown in Table 5A , the average depth of stagnation was higher in Latin America than it was in Africa in all decades other than the 1990s. In sub-Saharan Africa, the average length of stagnation was highest in the 1980s and 1990s whereas in Latin America it was highest in the 1960s and 1980s. In sub-Saharan Africa, the average depth of stagnation was highest in the 1990s whereas in Latin America it was highest in the 1960s. Th is suggests that the 1990s have not been a period of recovery in sub-Saharan Africa.
As shown in
It is also interesting to examine the correlation between the length and depth of stagnation by region and decade (see Table 5B ). It appears that in the 1990s, stagnation experiences in Latin America were likely to be long and deep. Th is is also true, but to a lesser degree, in sub-Saharan Africa. It is notable that the correlation between depth and length of stagnation seems to have been increasing monotonically across decades for countries in both continents. Over time, it has become more likely that stagnation spells will be both relatively deep and relatively long.
Factors Associated with Stagnation
In order to identify the factors associated with stagnation, we undertook a probit analysis of the factors that appear to aff ect the probability of being a stagnator. We treat whether a country is a stagnator as a binary dependent variable. Th e probabilities of occurrence of stagnation are assumed to be infl uenced by the independent variables and to be distributed normally.
In Table 9 , we report the summary statistics for the variables used in the subsequent regressions. Tables 10-11 outline the regression results for three versions of probit models with STAGNATOR (a variable which takes on a value of one when a country is a stagnator and a value of zero when it is not) as the dependent variable.
Appendix 1 lists the variables used in the analysis. Summary statistics concerning the variables used in all the probit regressions discussed in this section of the paper are shown in Table 9 . We have tried to include in the regressions undertaken (from which those reported are drawn) variables that are standard in the literature on the determinants of growth.
Th e models have relatively good 'fi t', with pseudo-R 2 ranging between 0.36 and 0.69. In addition, they show that certain factors are signifi cantly and often robustly associated with stagnation. Th ese include the growth rate of domestic credit, negatively associated with being a stagnator; the diff erence between the growth rate of the economically active population -between ages 15 and 65 -and the growth rate of the population total ('GEAPOPP'), negatively associated with being a stagnator; a dummy variable taking the value one for primary commodity exporters (according to criterion I) and zero otherwise, positively associated with being a stagnator; the number of revolutions and coups per year, positively associated with being a stagnator; an index of civil liberties taking the value of 1 at the highest and 7 at the lowest, positively associated with being a stagnator (implying an association between weaker civil liberties and stagnation); a dummy variable taking the value 1 for Latin American countries and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable taking the value 1 for sub-Saharan African countries and zero otherwise, both positively associated with being a stagnator.
Th e signs of these relationships are as one might predict, as is discussed below. Th e magnitude of these relationships is also often very substantial, as shown in Table 12A (columns 1-3). For example, the probability that a country is a stagnator when GEAPOPP (the rate at which the growth of economically active population outstrips the rate of growth of the entire population) is one-half a standard deviation above the mean for all countries is estimated (depending on the model specifi cation) to be between 41 and 46 per cent less than when it is one half a standard deviation below the mean. 6 Th e probability that a country is a stagnator when the number of revolutions and coups per year is one-half a standard deviation above the mean for all countries is estimated (depending on the model specifi cation) to be 20 per cent more than when it is one-half a standard deviation below the mean. Similarly, the probability that the country is a stagnator when the index of civil liberties is one-half a standard deviation above the mean for all countries is estimated to be 35 per cent more than when it is one-half a standard deviation below the mean. It is also found that primary commodity exporters according to criterion I have a probability of being a stagnator around 33 per cent above other countries.
As a check on the possibility that some of the factors considered above arise endogenously as a result of countries becoming stagnators, we repeated the analysis by using as the dependent variable STAGNA-TOR90, a dummy variable taking on a value of one if a country was a stagnator in the 1990s, and zero otherwise. We used data for the independent variables from the earlier period 1960 to 1989, so as to capture possible lagged relationships running from these independent variables to STAGNATOR90. 7 It is important to be cautious in interpreting the results found here as revealing any causal information, however, since stagnation from decade to decade is highly correlated, as discussed further below. We fi nd the relationships to be somewhat weaker, but still to be present. As reported in Table 11 , the Sub Saharan Africa Dummy, the Latin America Dummy, GEAPOPP, and the number of revolutions and coups per year are signifi cant. In contrast, the primary commodity exporter dummy I, the index of civil liberties, and the growth rate of domestic credit are no longer signifi cant. Th is is not wholly surprising, as the Sub Saharan Africa Dummy, the Latin America Dummy, and GEAPOPP (directly or indirectly) capture "structural" features of the economy that may have a long-term impact, whereas the index of civil liberties, and the growth rate of domestic credit represent phenomena (such as ambient political circumstances and the conduct of monetary policy) that may arguably have only a more transitory impact on economic performance.
It is also not surprising that measures of primary commodity export dependence are signifi cant determinants of stagnation, in light of the recent literature on the "natural resource curse", which emphasizes that for a range of political and economic (e.g. "Dutch disease") reasons, countries wealthy in natural resources may be poor economic performers (see, for instance, Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) , Sachs and Warner (1999) , Tornell and Lane (1999) ). However, the lack of signifi cance of the primary commodity exporter dummy I in regressions of STAGNATOR90 raises a question mark about the robustness of this relationship. Th is may be because a great deal of the eff ect of being a primary commodity exporter is captures by whether a country belongs in specifi c groupings (in particular Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa). Th e number of stagnating countries which are primary commodity exporters according to the fi rst of our criteria but neither in Latin America nor in sub-Saharan Africa is only seven (Algeria, Fiji, Iceland, Iraq, Kuwait, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia). Th e number of stagnating countries which are primary commodity exporters according to the second of our criteria, but are neither in Latin-American nor in sub-Saharan Africa is only four (Fiji, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia). In the overall sample of 119 countries (of which 32 are primary commodity exporters according to the fi rst criterion and 12 according to the second), the resulting independent variation may be insuffi cient to separately identify the eff ect of being a primary-commodity exporter on stagnation.
Th e fact that GEAPOPP is signifi cant underlines that a rapid rate of population increase (or rapid aging) that creates an increased rate of dependency of the young and the elderly upon the productive workers in the middle age brackets, may be an important factor creating vulnerability to per capita income stagnation. However, the relationship may be purely endogenous. It may simply be that stagnation causes a reduction in the economically active population and therefore a reduction in GEAPOPP. Th is latter theory is a possible explanation of the results found in the regressions involving STAGNATOR but not of those involving STAGNATOR90, as the latter seeks to identify the factors associated with subsequent stagnation. Both 7 Regression results using data from the earlier period 1974-1989 are similar to the ones we report here. mechanisms may in fact be present. Th is is suggested by the fact that the magnitude of the eff ect associated with GEAPOPP is substantially smaller in relation to STAGNATOR90 than in relation to STAGNATOR [See Table 12A ].
It is interesting to note that the investment share of GDP is also occasionally signifi cant. Th e sign of the relationship suggests that higher investment is associated with a higher probability of stagnation. Th is seems at fi rst implausible, but may be understood in light of the possibility that investment (especially planned public investment) is not always as downwardly fl exible as is real income. In this light, the identifi ed relationship may be more of an accounting curiosity than it is causally important.
In both sets of regressions, the Latin America dummy variable is consistently highly signifi cant, whereas the African dummy variable is moderately signifi cant only in the STAGNATOR90 regressions. One reason that this might be true is that the African dummy variable is highly correlated with other variables that are signifi cantly associated with being a stagnator (especially GEAPOPP, the primary commodity exporter dummy I, the number of revolutions and coups, and the index of civil liberties), whereas the Latin America dummy is not to the same extent. Th is may be seen in Table 12B , which reports pair-wise correlation coeffi cients among the variables used in both sets of regressions. Although stagnators are more likely to be present in both Africa and Latin America, the factors underlying stagnation in Africa appear to be captured better by those included in the regression analysis than are the factors that underlie stagnation in Latin America. Th e fact that the Latin America dummy variable is consistently signifi cant suggests that there are variables omitted from the analysis that are important causes of stagnation in Latin America.
The Tendency for Stagnation to Persist
It is possible to undertake an analysis of the tendency of countries to shift between non-stagnator and stagnator status. 8 Below, we explore whether countries that have a specifi c status (as stagnators or non-stagnators) in a particular decade are likely to maintain that status or change status in the subsequent decade. Th is analysis is undertaken in Table 13A in terms of the raw number of countries that 'stay or switch' and in Table  13B in terms of the proportion of countries that 'stay or switch' between stagnator and non-stagnator status in successive decades. Th e analysis leads to some striking conclusions.
First, if a country is a decadal stagnator in the 60s, it has a relatively small chance of not being a decadal stagnator in the 1990s (8.3 per cent). In contrast, countries that are stagnators in the 1970s or 1980s, have a higher chance of escaping stagnation by the end of the sample period (31.8 per cent and 37.9 per cent, respectively). However, the probability of being a stagnator in the 1990s if a country was a stagnator in previous decades is quite high: 75 per cent for stagnators from the 1960s, 54.5 per cent for stagnators from the 1970s, and 56.9 per cent for stagnators from the 1980s. Finally, the probability that a non-stagnator in the 1960s is a stagnator in the 1990s is relatively high (56.9 per cent). Th e probability of being a stagnator in the 1990s is therefore raised by about 20 per cent by having been a stagnator (as opposed to a non-stagnator) in the 1960s.
Th e highest probability (37.9 per cent) of a stagnator becoming a non-stagnator in a subsequent decade is experienced between the 1980s and the 1990s. Th e highest probability of a non-stagnator remaining a non-stagnator (74.5 per cent) is experienced between the 1960s and the 1970s. It is notable that the probability of switching out of stagnation has slightly increased over the decades. However, the probability of staying out of stagnation has not increased over the decades for the entire sample of countries. In fact, non-stagnators have had chances often signifi cantly higher than 50 of experiencing stagnation in subsequent decades.
It is most striking that the countries most likely to have been stagnators in the 1960s have a 75 per cent probability of being so in the 1990s. Th is suggests that underlying and diffi cult to change structural features of countries make them vulnerable to stagnation, or that stagnation episodes have long-lasting and detrimental eff ects that generate future vulnerability to stagnation.
It is also important to note that collapses do not occur randomly. Th ere appear to be trigger eff ects that are concentrated geographically (sub Saharan Africa, Latin America). In sub-Saharan Africa (Tables 14A  and 14B) , once a stagnator, the probability of remaining a stagnator in a subsequent decade ranges between 53.8 per cent and 77.8 per cent. Even worse, in the 1970s African non-stagnators were faced with a probability of 93.8 per cent of falling in stagnation during the 1980s. A similar pattern is observed for Latin American non-stagnators (Tables 15A and 15B) , which had a probability of 88.9 per cent of stagnating in the 1980s, if they had not stagnated in the 1970s. Th e data are suggestive of the fact that structural features of the economy may play an important role: if they have stagnated in the 1960s, African countries are 77.8 per cent likely to have stagnated in the 1990s, while if they have stagnated in the 1960s Latin American stagnators are 100 per cent likely to have stagnated in the 1990s.
Conclusions
We have examined the patterns and causes of real income stagnation (in which real-income growth was negligible or negative for a sizable uninterrupted sequence of years) during the last four decades in a large cross section of countries. Real income stagnation is a concept concerning the pattern of economic growth, and is distinct from that of low average growth as such. We have argued that real income stagnation is also conceptually diff erent from other growth patterns studied in the literature (e.g., those proposed by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005) . However, all such concepts must be used with care when undertaking welfare assessment.
We have found evidence to suggest that a large number of poor countries in the world have suff ered deep and lengthy spells of stagnation in the last four decades. Th ese spells of stagnation have caused many of these countries to have lower incomes today than they had at some point in the past. All countries which have experienced stagnation spells have lost 'potential' income. Countries that suff ered stagnation are more likely to have been poor, to have been located in certain regions of the world (in particular Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa), to have been confl ict-ridden and dependent on primary commodity exports.
Countries that suff ered from stagnation in the distant past are also much more likely to have suffered from stagnation in the recent past. Th ese results suggest either that stagnation spells have long-lasting eff ects that make the reoccurrence of stagnation likely or that there are enduring 'structural' features (within countries or in the global economy) that predispose specifi c countries to suff er repeatedly from stagnation episodes. Based on the first measure: countries with share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 above the mean are considered primary commodity exporters. c Based on the second measure: countries with share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 above one standard deviation from the mean are considered primary commodity exporters. d This is the variables ACCESS from the Sachs and Warner dataset. Physical access to international waters is measured by our land-lockedness variable. A country that borders the ocean (a "coastal economy") and that has a container port is given a value of 0, reflecting complete access to international shipping. A landlocked country without navigable access to the sea via rivers is given a value of 1. 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 11 . Factors Associated with Stagnation:
Tables and Charts
Probit models 4-6 (dependent variable STAGNATOR90).
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Real GDP per capita (1960) Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 12A . Effects on the dependent variable for Probit models (dependent variable STAGNATOR in (1)-(3) and STAGNATOR90 in (4)- (6)) Effects for the continuous regressors are shown for changes from their sample mean minus ½ standard deviation to their sample means plus ½ standard deviation. For discrete regressors, the effect of a change from 0 to 1 is shown.
( Note: A given cell (row, column) represents the number of countries in a given status during a decade (row) that had a specific status in a subsequent decade (column). For example, the number 9 in the first column of data should be interpreted as follows: 9 countries that were stagnators in the 1960s were also stagnators in the 1980s. The number 17 in the fourth column of data should be read as follows: 17 countries that were not stagnators in the 1970s were not stagnators in the 1990s either. (1970, 1980, 1990) PWT 6.1 Literacy rate (1960) Levine and Renelt data set, originally from WBSI Growth of real per capita GDP (chain) (averages over different time periods) Calculation by authors. PWT 6.1 Growth rate of domestic credit (average: 1960-1989) Levine and Renelt data set, originally from IMFIFS Investment share of GDP (average: 1960 GDP (average: -1989 Levine and Renelt data set, originally from WBNA Investment share of GDP (averages over different time periods) PWT 6.1 Growth of exports Levine and Renelt data set, originally from WBNA GEAPOPP: Difference between the growth rate of the economically active population (between ages 15 and 65) and growth of total population.
Sachs and Warner data set
Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970
Sachs and Warner data set Dummy variable for primary commodity exporters according to criterion I A country is classified as a primary commodity exporter if its share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970 is greater than the mean of the 172 countries in the Sachs and Warner dataset. Primary commodity exporters defined as such are: Algeria, Barbados, Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Dummy variable for primary commodity exporters according to criterion II
A country is classified as a primary commodity exporter if its share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970 is greater by more than one standard deviation above the mean for the 172 countries in the Sachs and Warner data set. Primary commodity exporters defined as such are: Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Zambia Number of revolutions and coups per year Levine and Renelt data set, originally from Barro (1991) Index of civil liberties (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) Levine and Renelt data set, originally from Barro (1991) 
